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IV

I.
PARTIES.
This is an appeal from Orders entered by the United States District Court
for the District of Utah denying Plaintiffs/Appellant's Motion To Alter Or Amend
Judgment and for granting Defendant/Appellee Matthew Larson's Motion For
Summary Judgment in a deadly force § 1983 civil rights suit based upon statute of
limitations. Defendant/Appellee Larson is the sole defendant in this matter, he is
responsible for illegally shooting Bertina Rae Olseth while she was in police
custody. Olseth is the Plaintiff/Appellant.
II.
RECORD ON APPEAL.
Olseth has filed an Appendix containing the District Court Docket,
pleadings and other matters including a transcript of the hearing on Larson's
Motion For Summary Judgment. The materials contained in that Appendix will be
cited by referring to the name of the document followed by "App." and the page
number of the Appendix on which the document may be found. Olseth has also
included in her Brie/'an Addendum containing the Orders appealed from. The
materials contained in the Addendum will be cited by referring to the name of the
document followed by "Add." and the page number of the Addendum on which the
document may be found.

III.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.
This Court has jurisidiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (1953, as
amended) ((1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions
of state law certified by a court of the United States. The U.S. Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals certified the question before this Court resulting from Olseth's
appeal of her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action against a police officer who
wrongful shot her several times from behind - excessive force claim. The U.S.
District Court's jurisdiction was involved under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, 28 U.S.C. §
1331, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988. Case law requires the U.S. District Court to
"borrow" the appropriate statute of limitations because the Congress failed to
establish one.

IV.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES.
Is the statute of limitations tolled under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 when a
person against whom a claim has accrued has left the state of Utah and has no
agent within the state of Utah upon whom service of process can be made instead,
but the person is amenable to service pursuant to Utah's long-arm statute, Utah
2

Code Ann. § 78-27-24? Answer is "yes" statute of limitations is tolled. Section
78-27-24 only establishes in personam jurisdiction upon non-residents. Section
78-12-35 concerns the tolling of subject matter jurisdiction while a Utah resident
is absent from the state of Utah.
V.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
1.

Plaintiff filed her first action in this matter on May 15, 2000 against

Salt Lake City Corporation, Salt Lake City Police Department and various police
officers of Salt Lake City, (Case No. 2:00-CV-0402C), including Larson. (App.
53). That action alleged civil rights violations resulting from Plaintiffs arrest and
injuries sustained when she was shot while commandeering a police vehicle on
May 15, 1998. (App. 1-24, 30-37, 54). The only cause of action pled in her
Complaint, relevant to this action, was for an alleged 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation
based on her allegation of unlawful use of deadly force. (App. 47). The only
relief pled in her Complaint was for compensatory damages, prejudgment interest,
and attorney's fees and costs. (App. 47).
2.

Plaintiffs first Complaint was dismissed by Judge Campbell on May

15, 2002 for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff filed her second Complaint on October
11, 2002 against the same parties, regarding the same facts and allegations, but
3

which sought to add new causes of action. The City moved for dismissal of all
causes of action and parties. (App. 47). On June 6, 2003, the court granted in part
the City's motion, allowing only the "loss of limb or member" cause of action to
remain against the City. (App. 47).
3.

Upon the stipulation of the parties, Plaintiff amended her Complaint

on September 17, 2003. (App. 25, 47). Plaintiffs Complaint named Matthew D.
Larson as the Defendant in his individual capacity, and asserts a cause of action
against him under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of Plaintiff s 14th, 9th
and 10th Amendment rights. (App. 47).
4.

In his Motion For Summary Judgment, Larson claimed he was never

sued in his individual capacity until Plaintiff filed her second Complaint on
October 11, 2002, more than four years after the incident complained of. He
argued that because Olseth sued Larson^or the first time in his individual capacity
beyond the general 4 year statute of limitations period her Complaint must be
dismissed. (App. 31, 48).
5.

In opposition to summary judgment, Plaintiff asserted two defenses:

(1) that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1953, as amended) extends the statute of
limitations by one year when a dismissal resulted in the first case's dismissal upon
procedural grounds, and (2) due to Larson's absence from the State of Utah, the

statute of limitations period was tolled under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 (1953,
as amended). (App. 59-60).
6.

Then in a surprising maneuver, at the hearing on oral arguments for

summary judgment, Larson's counsel raised a new argument. Relying on Rodman
and Lund, Larson asserted that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 was not available as a
defense to summary judment. Relying on these cases, it was proffered without any
factual support, that Mr. Larson was amendable to service and therefore the statute
of limitations had run. (App. 87, 89).
7.

Based upon the surprising argument, on March 2, 2004, the court

granted summary judgment, but reserved for Plaintiff 10 days in which to move to
alter or amend judgment, if desired. (App. 85, 101).
8.

Within 10 days, on March 9, 2004, Olseth filed her motion arguing

that Section § 41-12a-505 did not control because that section applied only to
nonresident motor vehicle accident cases, where the State Legislature created an
agent and a procedure for personal service upon a nonresident driver through the
Department of Commerce. Because an agent exists in the state of Utah in those
situations, a nonresident motor vehicle operator defendant is amenable to service
and therefore tolling under Section 78-12-35 is not available. (App. 108-112).
9.

Without any opposition by Larson, the Court denied the motion only

claiming that Olseth failed to address the Rodman case. (App. 149-151).
VII.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS.
Judge Cassell was incorrect to deny the Motion To Alter Or Amend
Judgment. (App. 149-153). The denial was plain error and an abuse of discretion
in that he was opposite to the governing case law. Firstly, no evidence existed that
Larson was ever amenable to service and it was undisputed that he was absent
from the State of Utah. (App. 87). Secondly, The Motion To Alter Or Amend
Judgment was unopposed by Larson-under local rule D.U.Civ.P. 7-1, default
should have been entered. Finally, it is indisputable that the first lawsuit was
dismissed on procedural grounds and that a filing against a police officer in his
official capacity versus a lawsuit against him in his individual capacity are both
procedural errors. (App. 47). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1953, as
amended), a second lawsuit can cure these types of errors contained in Olseth's
first lawsuit. (App. 59-61).
VIII.
ARGUMENTS.
POINT I. THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS WERE TOLLED DUE TO
LARSON'S (A RESIDENT) ABSENCE FROM THE STATE.

As this Court is well aware, Congress provided no specific statute of
limitations for actions under the Civil Rights Acts. 42 U.S.C. 1988 endorses for
the Civil Rights Acts the "settled practice" of adopting a state limitations period
when the federal statute provides no such period, provided the state limitations
period is not inconsistent with federal law or policy. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.
261, 266-67, 85 L. Ed. 2d 254, 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985); see also Owens v.
Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 239, 102 L. Ed. 2d 594, 109 S. Ct. 573 (1989). As the
Supreme Court has acknowledged, section 1988 mandates a three-step procedure
for selecting such a state limitations period:
First, courts are to look to the laws of the United States "so far as such
laws are suitable to carry [the civil and criminal civil rights statutes] into
effect." If no suitable federal rule exists, courts undertake the second step
by considering application of state "common law, as modified and changed
by the constitution and statutes" of the forum state. A third step asserts the
predominance of the federal interest: courts are to apply state law only if it
is not "inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States."
Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47-48, 82 L. Ed. 2d 36, 104 S. Ct. 2924 (1984)
(citations omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 1988); accord Wilson, 471 U.S. at 267.
Since section 1983 indisputably contains no statute of limitations, the trial court
must consider and apply the appropriate statute of limitations, subject to any
tolling provisions available to these parties apply from the State of Utah, the state
in which the Larson's shooting of Olseth occurred while she was in his custody.

While section 1988 directs the trial court to borrow state limitations
periods, it provides no guidance on how to select the appropriate one.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has told us to select the "most analogous" or
"most appropriate" statute of limitations. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446
U.S. 478, 485, 64 L. Ed. 2d 440, 100 S. Ct. 1790 (1980); Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., All U.S. 454, 462, 44 L. Ed. 2d 295, 95 S. Ct. 1716
(1975). It must, of course, be "consistent with federal law and policy." Owens,
488 U.S. at 239.
Wilson dictates a three-part analysis to determine which state statute is most
appropriate or analogous:
We must first consider whether state law or federal law governs the
characterization of a 1983 claim for statute of limitations purposes. If
federal law applies, we must next decide whether all 1983 claims should be
characterized in the same way, or whether they should be evaluated
differently depending upon the varying factual circumstances and legal
theories presented in each individual case. Finally, we must characterize
the essence of the claim in the pending case, and decide which state statute
provides the most appropriate limiting principle.
Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268.
Having answered the first question affirmatively — "the characterization of 1983
[is] to be measured by federal rather than state standards" ~ the Wilson Court
concluded that section 1988 directs the selection for each state of "the one most
8

appropriate statute of limitations for all 1983 claims." Id. at 270, 275.
In this matter, Olseth argued to the trial court that Utah Code Ann. § 78-1240 (1953, as amended) was the most analogous provision applicable because this
matter was the second lawsuit, after having the first matter being dismissed for
procedural grounds. (App. 59-61, 85). Section 78-12-40 extends the statute of
limitations for situations such as the one at hand. See McGuire v. University of
Utah Medical Or., 603 P.2d 786 (Utah 1979).
Meanwhile, Larson's proposition contradicts the obvious application of 7812-40 the application of Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-505 (1953, as amended) it is
clear from reading both Lund v. Hall, 938 P.2d 285 (Utah 1997) and Ankers v.
Rodman, 995 F. Supp. 1329 (U. Dist. 1997) of which neither case if factually
similar to the facts this matter-clearly the cases are distinguishable. (App. 85-93).
Before the trial court, Plaintiff admitted the factual allegations contained in
Larson's motion for summary judgment, but debated the argument that "Because
[Olseth] sued Larson for the first time in his individual capacity beyond the statute
of limitations period her Complaint must be dismissed." (App. 56). In disputing
the claim, the plaintiff argued that the statute of limitations was (1) extended by
Section 78-12-40 and (2) tolled by his absence from the state under Section 78-1235. It is indisputable that Larson now resides in Oklahoma, and as conceded by
9

counsel has since 2001. The effect of counsel's admission is that Olseth's claims
have been tolled as against Larson. See Section 78-12-35. This section read:
Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the state,
the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter
after his return to the state. If after a cause of action accrues he departs from
the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the
commencement of the action.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 (2003). In this matter, the second sentence of 78-1235 is important to understand Olseth's position on appeal.
In Utah, it is well recognized that the statute runs only during the time a
debtor is openly in state, and immediately on his leaving it the statute again ceases
to run until his return; in computing time all periods of absence must be
considered and added together. Keith-O'Brien Co. v. Snyder, 51 Utah 227, 169 P.
954 (1917). In this matter, although it is unclear to Olseth as to a particular date
the defendant left the state of Utah, and it is uncertain whether he has ever
returned, Olseth contends that Officer Larson has removed himself from the state
for a couple of years prior to Judge Cassell's dismissal of the second lawsuit.
Based upon information and belief Larson left the state for an FBI position in
Oklahoma shortly following 01seth'sl999 trial.1 (App. 57).
1

Consequently, due to Officer Larson's absencefromthe State of Utah, Judge
Cassell's ruling is technically voidable. When the City sought its dismissal of
Plaintiffs malicious prosecution cause of action it fully was aware of the fact that
10

In defense to Ms. Olseth's claim, the Defendant, by proffer alone
represented that Mr. Larson was amenable to personal service but offered no
evidence to support the notion, only armed with the cases Lund and Rodman.
(App. 89). That in court utterance is non-applicable misleading the court to
dismiss. The statement was only a mere bald statement without any factual
support. For Summary Judgment purposes, absent any supporting evidence that he
is truly amenable to service or by what means actual service may be accomplished,
summary judgment was to be applied in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.
In Lund, the Utah Supreme Court in 1997 held that because the defendant
was at all times amenable to service of legal process due to a true and lawful
attorney's appointment, hence the tolling provision did not apply. In its reasoning,
the Lund Court explained that the legislature had established substituted means of
personal service in Section 41-12a-505. Lund case is unique because it was a
motor vehicle accident involving a nonresident motorist. In Olseth's situation,
this matter is entirely distinguishable from Lund. In this matter, the defendant was
a Utah resident, and then subsequently absent himself from the State of Utah.

Larson had left the State tolling that issue. This Court through a material act was
misled to rule against Olseth. Meanwhile, this Court should remand this matter for
further determination as to when Larson left the State and if ever, returned to the
State. The record of devoid of any evidence to support the proposition that Larson
was ever amenable to service.
11

Because he relocated himself and his family, noone remained to accept service.
The means of service of process in Lund was statutorily set forth in Utah's
Nonresident Motor Vehicle Act. That act specifically sets forth a means of service
of process for nonresidents involved in a motor vehicle accident. The Act
appoints the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code as the true and
lawful attorney of legal process within the State of Utah for the purpose of
accomplishing service. Due to the existence of a legal representative, tolling was
not an issue and cannot be an issue in an accident involving a motor vehicle
accident of a nonresident. In contrast, Mr. Larson, clearly a Utah resident at the
time he breached his duty to protect his prisoner when he shot Olseth several times
from behind for doing nothing more than embarrassing him after he arrested her,
had no attorney in fact, statutory appointed alternate means of personal service, or
an authorized agent to accept personal service on his behalf. The record in this
case shows that when specifically requested, the City attorney's office refused to
accept service at ever juncture. (App. 90).
Later on, after committing perjury during Olseth's State criminal
proceedings, the record reflects that Larson undeniably left the state of Utah in
2001. It's important to understand Olseth was acquitted of the aggravated assault
charge Larson falsely accused Olseth of committing. Moreover, its important to
12

know that the City and Mr. Larson wrongfully concealed exculpatory evidence
from Olseth and her defense counsel during that criminal trial. (App. 118-121).
The material information contained in these exhibits was never mentioned at trial
despite cross-examination.
Upon his absence, Larson was no longer amenable to personal service in the
State of Utah, at all. Even though, Larson's counsel merely argued that Larson
was amenable to personal service, the trial court accepted that statement alone and
then dismissed Olseth's final claim by granting summary judgment for statute of
limitations. (App. 87, 98). There is no factual record to back the statement up.
The Nonresident Motor Vehicle Act does not apply to this matter. No other
statutes excludes Larson in his situation, not even Utah's Long Arm Statute, 7827-24. Unlike the Nonresident Motor Vehicle Act, the Long-Arm Jurisdiction Act
does not provide a substitute method of accomplishing service of process in the
State of Utah. This Court in the case Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill, 608 P.2d
244 (1980) addresses the purpose of Section 78-27-24. In it, this Court held that
Section 78-27-24 created in personam jurisdiction over individuals not within the
state of Utah and required them to fulfill the two-part test to establish "minimal
contacts." Minimal contacts was not the issue here, nor was the issue that Larson
was a nonresident. At all times relevant to the suit, Larson was a resident and had
13

since absent himself from the State of Utah. Therefore, tolling was the only
appropriate argument the court should have accepted pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-35. It's important to recall that it is the moving party's responsibility to
demonstrate through supporting evidence how was he amenable to service by
actual presence within the State or that the appointment of a true and lawful
attorney existed to actually defeat Olseth's tolling argument. Once Larson no
longer maintained his residency in Utah, and he and his family left the State,
Larson no longer had a legal representative. Section 41-12a-505, appoints "a true
and lawful attorney." In this matter, no such true and lawful attorney is or
admittedly was established clear until 2003, when Mr. J. Wesley Robinson final
accepted service after repeated attempts. In the former Tena Campbell action, The
City refused to act as Mr. Larson's true attorney. As a matter of fact, as Mr.
Robinson admitted in this proceeding, the former action was one in Mr. Larson's
official capacity or against the City in other words. Well even in that matter, the
City required personal service upon him anyhow when Olseth served only the City
originally. The City and Larson cannot reap the benefits of having it both ways.
Equitable tolling doctrines were created to protect injured parties from mischief.
Once the true circumstances of Mr. Larson's residency was discovered, the fair
answer from this Court should be that upon discovery that Larson was no longer
14

available for process of service within the state of Utah, under the discovery
doctrine, Olseth should have one year to effect proper service. This ruling fairly
provides adequate due process protection for all interested parties, including these
litigants, the Federal Court system, and Utah citizens and its visitors alike. This
appears to be a case of first impression, therefore there is no cited caselaw.
As for the Rodman case, Rodman is nothing more than persuasive authority
and in this matter is not even that. Rodman's situation is unique to the case at
hand. Ankers v. Rodman, 995 F. Supp. 1329 (U. Dist. 1997), the district court
judge, David Sam dismissed Ankers' civil action be in his opinion the matter was
time-barred. Judge Sam was correct in this matter because that action was a
diversity claim filed in Federal Court because Dennis Rodman had assaulted
Lavon Ankers during a Utah Jazz versus San Antonio Spurs NBA basketball
game. Ms. Ankers, who was an usher in the Delta Center was in her assigned
position in the arena near the court. At one point during the fourth quarter of play,
Mr. Rodman pinched Ms. Ankers on the buttocks. She sued Rodman for battery
and intentional infliction of emotional distress nearly two years after the incident.
In Utah, these types of claims must be filed within one year of the incident.
Plaintiff argued tolling under section 78-12-35. Appropriately tolling was not
available under that situation because the defendant Rodman was not a Utah
15

resident. Clearly Mr. Rodman never was a Utah citizen and Ankers knew that or
reasonably should have known that he was not given the Antonio Spurs namesake.
Unlike Mr. Rodman, Larson in this matter was a Utah resident, however. Until it
was discovered Larson was no longer a Utah resident, that period should be tolled
for her protection.
Judge Cassell was plainly wrong for granting summary judgment. Under
either theory, sections 78-12-40 or 78-12-35, the statute of limitations was not an
issue. Because of the dismissal by Judge Campbell in the first lawsuit section 7812-40 extended the statute of limitations period by a year. Because Larson absent
himself from the state in 2001, the statute of limitations period was tolled from
2001 for the time thereafter.

POINT II. NO EVIDENCE OF LARSON'S ALLEGED AMENABILITY TO
SERVICE WAS EVER DEMONSTRATED-MOREOVER NO RECORD
EXISTS OF AMENABILITY TO SERVICE.
On summary judgment, the standard of practice is well-settled in this circuit
and Utah, taking our direction from the Supreme Court. The Court in Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 322-23, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986)
has dictated that the burden of persuasion is first on the moving party and the court
must construe the facts before it in light most favorable to the moving party. In
16

this case, this standard was not followed. In this matter, the Court accepted the
time-bar claim simply on the proffer by counsel that Larson was amenable to
service. Larson's counsel provided no evidence to the record to demonstrate that
Larson was ever amenable to personal service. (App. 87). Quite to the contrary,
the record demonstrated that Larson was never amenable to service. (App. 106148, 82-103). In both actions, the first lawsuit, the City Attorney's Office
specifically required Plaintiff to effectuate personal service upon Larson even
though the complaint erroneously pled against Larson in his official capacity.
Because of his personal service, he cannot later argue no notice-he has his
attorneys to thank for that. Later, after the first lawsuit was dismissed by Judge
Campbell for failure to prosecute, and since Larson was no longer in the state of
Utah, the City Attorney's Office refused to accept service claiming (1) not to be
his attorney, and (2) not have any contact with him.2 (App. 111).
In this matter, because the clear weight of the evidence shows that Mr.
Larson had left the state of Utah, the district court plainly should have applied
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35. Again this section reads:
Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the state,
the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter

2

At no time was it revealed to Olseth though that Larson had left the state to
join the FBI in Oklahoma.
17

after his return to the state. If after a cause of action accrues he departs from
the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the
commencement of the action.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 (2003). Lund's parent case, Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah
2d 254, 390 P.2d 915 (Utah 1964), first ruled on the nonresident motor vehicle
issue. Snyder, assists us in the understanding the application of 78-12-35. Justice
Crockett conceded that on a superficial look 78-12-35 could apply but then
reasoned against it applying the nonresident motor vehicle act, declaring, "The
effect of [the nonresident motor vehicle act established in 1948] is to constitute the
Secretary of State as the agent of a nonresident motorist to receive process for [the
defendant]. Further pertinent to this problem is Rule 4(e) (1) U.R.C.P., which
states that personal service may be made upon a defendant '* * * by delivering a
copy to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of
process.'" Id., 15 Utah 2d 256. (Emphasis added.)
These decisions, both Lund and Snyder do not disturb the well-settled case
of Keith-O'Brien Co. v. Snyder, 51 Utah 227, 169 P. 954 (1917) concerning
section 78-12-35. The Keith-O'Brien, Court held that absence from the state tolls
the statute, [] that the statute runs only during the time the debtor is openly in the
state and immediately on his leaving it the statute against ceases to run until his
return, and that in computing time all the periods of absence must be considered
18

and added together.
CONCLUSION
The district court used Lund and Rodman without factual support to
conclude that the statute of limitations had expired. The court granted summary
judgment against Olseth's § 1983 claim for wrongful use of deadly force believing
that the claim was time-barred because Larson was amenable to personal service.
But clearly the Nonresident Motor Vehicle Act and Rodman's Texas residency are
the reasons neither case controls the outcome of this matter. Under either Sections
78-12-35, 78-12-40, or both, summary judgment never should have been granted.
Under the points argued above, and the governing statutes, case law, and court
rules cited, summary judgment should be reversed and the matter should be
remanded for trial. In the alternative, the district court should take evidence
concerning the City's amenable for service claim-and service by publication is not
acceptable as an answer from the defendant or we may find ourselves back on
appeal. It is a form of reliable personal service such as what the Nonresident
Motor Vehicle Act provides that is the appropriate answer.

19

ORAL ARGUMENTS REQUESTED.
In this matter, Olseth hereby requests oral arguments because the facts and
history of the case is significant and are extremely detailed. Olseth believes that
once the details are clearly understood, a ruling in her favor is imminent. Because
of Larson's ambush at the hearing on oral arguments, it is understandable why the
trial court mistakenly accepted Larson's counsel's argument of amenability to
personal service. Once the judge made his mind however, he was unwilling to
alter his judgment even when Olseth's motion to alter or amend judgment was
unopposed. Olseth requests oral arguments to give this court an opportunity to
answer questions that may arise among panel members through a review of the
briefs in this matter.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of April, 2006.

D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant
Bertina Rae "Tina" Olseth

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING.
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 21st day of April, 2006,
I caused two true and correct copies of Appellant's Brief to be mailed, first-class
postage prepaid, to the following:
J. Wesley Robinson
SALT LAKE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
451 South State Street, Suite 505
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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